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Introduction
Borrowing by UK households has risen rapidly in recent years so that by 2002 the overall amount owed was worth over 120 per cent of annual post-tax income. The majority of this debt is accounted for by mortgages, secured on the borrower's home, but the proportion that is unsecured is now worth around 20 per cent of household income, almost double what it was in 1994.
Unsecured debt differs from secured debt in terms of its purposes, cost, flexibility and risk. Traditionally, the main purpose of unsecured debt has been to finance durable consumption while secured debt has financed house purchase, but the purposes for which debt is used are changing. During the 1990s, more use was made of unsecured debt to finance holidays, clothing or special occasions 1 while secured debt increasingly financed consumption through mortgage equity withdrawal (see Davey (2001) ). These developments suggest that debt is much less closely related to particular purchases than in the past. Usually, unsecured debt has a relatively higher cost since lack of collateral leads to higher interest rates and shorter terms than secured debt. However, there is also an increasing amount of aggregate unsecured debt that does not bear any explicit interest, arising from purchases offering interest-free credit or from the use of credit cards that do not bear interest if settled at the end of each month.
This paper attempts to assess what lies behind the greater use of unsecured debt by British households since this potentially has implications for both macroeconomic and financial stability. It does this by means of a detailed investigation of the determinants of borrowing at the individual level using information from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This attempts to clarify the type of factors that influence borrowing and whether these have changed recently. Is it that people are borrowing more because they feel more confident about the future, or is it simply more convenient for them to finance spending in this way? What are the characteristics of borrowers and have these changed recently?
Overall levels of borrowing can be understood in life-cycle permanent income hypothesis models where debt allows individuals to smooth consumption over the life cycle and to finance the purchase of assets such as houses and consumer durables. Changing levels of borrowing can then be explained within this framework as a response to factors affecting individual spending, including relaxation of credit constraints and other shifts on the supply-side of the financial market that might influence the way in which spending is financed. In this paper we extend this model to take account of differences between secured and unsecured debt. Because secured debt is cheaper than unsecured debt, secured debt will be used in preference to unsecured debt when it is available. This points to the importance in the empirical analysis in taking account of the position of the individual borrower in the housing market.
Empirical analysis on the determinants of debt using household-level data is quite extensive for US households. For instance, Cox and Japelli (1993) use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to estimate a cross-section demand for debt for US households. They find a positive relationship with permanent income and net worth and a negative relationship with current income and age. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) also use the 1983 SCF and find that the demand for debt of young households is positively related to wealth, income and household size and negatively related to unemployment.
Crook (2001) focuses on a more recent period and finds that US households' demand for debt is related positively with income, home ownership, family size, and job status; and negatively to net worth, age (when the head of the household is over 55 years old) and risk aversion.
For British households, Bridges and Disney (2002) examine the access to unsecured-credit of lowincome households finding that it is positively associated with income-related and income generating characteristics. Banks et al (2002) describe the distribution of British household debt according to the BHPS as a part of a very comprehensive analysis of the distribution of financial wealth in the UK in year 2000. Cox et al (2002) also use the BHPS to analyse the changes in the distribution of household debt-to-income ratios, income and assets across borrowers and concluded that the increase in debt of British households during the second half of the 1990s was larger among the youngest and lowest-income households.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 extends a standard life-cycle model of consumption to take account of the relationship between secured and unsecured borrowing. Section 3 outlines the empirical method used. Section 4 describes unsecured debt in the BHPS and examines the determinants of debt in the cross section. Section 5 focuses on debt changes using the panel dimension in the BHPS. Section 6 concludes.
The theoretical determinants of debt
One of the most important characteristics of unsecured debt is that it is expensive relative to other possible methods of finance such as secured borrowing or running down asset holding. This would suggest that its use be concentrated among those who do not have access to cheaper finance. In this section we outline a calibrated version of the life-cycle model of consumption where individuals are able to borrow at relatively low rates against the security of their house, but have to pay higher rates for unsecured borrowing. This model captures many of the key characteristics of the UK debt market in that household financial decisions appear to be strongly tied to the individual's position in the housing market. The model can be used as a framework for understanding the effect of factors which vary across individuals, thereby accounting for cross-sectional differences in indebtedness, and factors which change over time.
Individuals are assumed to be economically active for three periods reflecting different phases of the life cycle. During this time they earn an exogenous income stream and consume non-durable goods and housing. They aim to maximise intertemporal utility and die solvent. Their intertemporal utility function at the beginning of their lives is given by:
where h and c are their holdings of housing and consumption of goods respectively, α is a parameter indicating their preference for housing relative to goods, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and δ indicates their rate of time preference.
Individuals face the following flow budget constraint:
where s and u are stocks of secured and unsecured debt respectively, y is exogenous nominal nonproperty income, p t and q t are the prices of goods and housing respectively, r is the rate of interest on secured debt and η is the premium on unsecured borrowing. It is assumed that all households aim to die with zero net worth, so that at the beginning of the period after their death (at date 4) the proceeds from the sale of the house is sufficient to pay off all remaining debt.
Individuals can use secured and unsecured debt to smooth their spending over time. The use of secured and unsecured-debt is assumed to be constrained such that:
The first expression states that secured debt cannot exceed a proportion, φ of the value of the borrowing individual's house qh. The second expression states that unsecured debt cannot be negative (so individuals cannot lend at high unsecured interest rates).
The choice of how much secured and unsecured debt to issue is then determined jointly with that of how much to consume and how much to spend on housing. Optimal housing and non-housing consumption is derived by maximising (2.1) subject to (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). There are three possible solutions at any date depending on which of the borrowing constraints are binding. These are reflected in the first order conditions for intertemporal consumption over time (2.5) and the choice between housing and goods (2.6) written for the case when the secured debt constraint is binding: In this case, when the constraint on secured debt is binding, both inter-temporal and intratemporal consumption decisions are affected by the rate of interest on secured borrowing. When the secured debt constraint is not binding then the premium on unsecured debt drops out of these conditions. This would have the effect of raising current relative to future consumption and changing the effective relative price of housing. The third possible outcome is a corner solution where household borrowing would violate the secured borrowing constraint if consumption choices could be made at secured borrowing rates, but be within the constraint when choices are made at higher unsecured rates.
Depending on the exact specification of preferences, the model can be solved for the optimal time profile of consumption of housing and goods that satisfy the budget constraint and the terminal condition. Iterative methods need to be used since behaviour at any date depends on whether secured borrowing constraints are expected to be binding in the future. The solution is illustrated here by means of a model calibrated roughly to the UK situation. The three periods of the model can be thought of as representing fifteen years each.
The results of the simulation are shown in Table A for different scenarios and for two different levels of the premium on unsecured borrowing. In the first case, income in the first period is £300 thousand, consistent with annual income of £20,000. This rises to the equivalent of £40,000 per annum in the second stage of life, before falling back to £15,000 per annum in the last stage of life which includes retirement. The rate of time preference has been set equal to the rate of interest on secured debt so that in the absence of constraints individuals would smooth consumption over their life-cycle by borrowing when young, saving when in middle age and running down their assets in old age and at death. But the imposition of a limit on secured borrowing up to 90 per cent of the value of owned housing prevents individuals from reaching this optimum.
In the case where the premium on unsecured debt is 0.1, consumption of goods in the first period is virtually equal to income and the stock of housing is £54,400, just over 2.5 times annual income. This is financed by secured debt of £48,900, the maximum possible given the secured borrowing constraint. Unsecured borrowing in the first period is relatively small at £500. After the first period, the borrowing constraint in the model no longer binds so that individuals choose the same level of consumption in the second and third stages of life. The pattern of income over time means that individuals build up financial assets during the second stage of life and run these down in the third stage so that when they die the value of their house is sufficient to pay off their secured debt. Only in the first period of life is any unsecured debt borrowed.
In the same circumstances, but where the premium on unsecured debt is lower at 0.05, individuals are better able to smooth consumption over time. Consumption is higher in the first stage of life and lower thereafter. This is financed both by higher secured and unsecured borrowing; secured borrowing is higher since individuals choose to buy a larger stock of housing, with the additional amount effectively financed by unsecured borrowing, which eases the secured borrowing constraint somewhat. Note that despite the lower rate of interest on unsecured borrowing, those in the second and third stage of life do not use it because cheaper secured borrowing is available.
The second case we consider is of a higher secured borrowing limit of 95 per cent of the value of the individual's house, rather than 90 per cent as in the base case. The main effect is in causing individuals to substitute secured debt for unsecured debt with little or no noticeable effect on first period spending in either case. The reason for this negligible impact is that the change in the borrowing limit does little to alleviate the constraint. In the absence of any restriction on secured borrowing, individuals in the same circumstances would choose to invest £80,000 in housing and borrow £140,000, a loan to value ratio of 175 per cent, using the additional resources to finance consumption of goods. Hence, the relaxation of the constraint does little to move individuals to their optimum position.
The third case shows the behaviour of those who are not owner occupiers (other than to a trivial extent). Consumption smoothing is prevented by the higher rate of interest on borrowing which leads to less consumption than optimal being chosen in the first stage of life. This is clearly less of a problem when the premium on unsecured borrowing is lower. In the cross-section, in comparison with those who have a stronger preference for housing, unsecured borrowing is higher for those who do not have access to the secured debt market, although their overall level of borrowing is lower since they do not have to finance the purchase of a house. Their net worth is also lower since they have little taste for tangible assets.
The fourth case illustrates the importance of income expectations on borrowing. With second stage income expected to be the same as in the first stage of life, it is possible for the individual to smooth consumption. Note that the stock of housing purchased in the first stage of life is higher than for those who have higher lifetime incomes but are constrained from borrowing as much as they would like, indicating the effect of the borrowing constraint on the intratemporal consumption decision.
The fifth case shows the effect of less patience. In the high-unsecured premium case, this leads to a hump-shaped path of consumption, with the premium on borrowing causing impatient individuals to restrain their desire for present consumption. Despite this, their unsecured borrowing exceeds their secured borrowing. In the low unsecured premium case, there is no hump shape in consumption as individuals are more able to achieve their preferred consumption path.
The implications of the model are that unsecured debt is likely to be used more by those who are young, impatient, with strong income expectations and no access to cheaper secured debt. It is likely to be used most when unsecured borrowing costs least.
Estimating the empirical determinants of unsecured debt
The previous discussion showed that unsecured borrowing is related to the individual's position in the life-cycle, access to cheaper, secured finance, income and income expectations and the cost of unsecured borrowing. In this section, we describe how the determinants of the demand for unsecured debt may be estimated empirically. Suppose that the demand for unsecured debt by individual i at date t, D it , is of the following general form:
where α i is an individual specific fixed effect, Y represents the income and other economic circumstances of the individual, Z the individual's demographic and other personal characteristics including age related effects, r the individual-specific interest rate levied on unsecured debt and ε the unobserved determinants of unsecured debt. The coefficients, other than the fixed effect, α i , can potentially vary over time.
Supply conditions in the unsecured credit market are reflected in the effective rate of interest charged on unsecured debt. Where individuals are credit constrained, the effective rate can be thought of as being high enough that their demand for unsecured loans is equal to the supply. Thus, the effective interest rate might be given by:
where r b is the base rate, ϕ t is the premium that financial institutions charge to the riskiest individuals and the negative relationship between the effective rate and individual income reflects lower perceived lending risks at high levels of individual income. Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) then gives a reduced form debt function:
This expression helps to clarify a number of points relevant to how it is estimated. First, in crosssections, it is impossible to estimate the individual specific fixed effects, α i , and the intercept term has to be imposed at the same value across all individuals. This means that any genuine fixed effects become part of the error term. If these are correlated with any of the right hand side variables then the relevant coefficients are biased. Thus if individuals with a particularly high rate of time preference also choose to work more and so give themselves higher income, then the estimated coefficient on income will overstate the genuine effect of income on unsecured borrowing. Second, also in cross-sections, there is no variation across individuals in macroeconomic variables such as the base rate of interest, r b , as such their impact becomes part of the overall intercept term. Third, with panel data, it is possible to avoid the biases due to individual specific fixed effects and to identify the impact of macroeconomic factors, but it is also necessary to assume that coefficients are either constant over time, or have a relatively simple structure.
A key feature of the theoretical model and of the data is that many individuals will choose not to use unsecured debt. Then, the estimation of parameters in (3.3) with a Tobit approach will be highly influenced by participation decisions. Failure to take account of this could lead to the estimated coefficients being affected by sample selection bias. For example, estimation of (3.3) for only those individuals with unsecured debt would lead to biased estimates of the true underlying coefficients if the sample is partly self-selecting and includes individuals with unobservable characteristics that predispose them to having unsecured debt. Biases would also arise if quantitative credit constraints prevent some individuals participating in the market.
In principle, such biases can be avoided using the suggestion of Heckman (1979) which involves estimating a model of the credit market participation decision where this is conditioned on factors additional to those that determine how much debt to have. Studies similar to ours, such as Duca and Rosenthal (1993) , Cox and Japelli (1993) and Crook (2001) , use a two-step Heckman procedure to obtain parameters of the demand for debt by including two additional terms in the debt-equation to capture the probability of an individual participating in the credit market and not being credit constraint. These are estimated in a first step using probit models to estimate the probability of participating in the market and the probability of being unconstrained 2 . Then the estimated hazards are included as additional regressors in (3.3), so that the parameters can be interpreted as those of a true demand function.
The BHPS, unlike the US surveys, does not provide any direct measure that would make it possible to discriminate between constrained and unconstrained individuals. Although it is unlikely that many individuals in the UK are unable to borrow at all. 3 Furthermore, the implementation of the Heckman procedure is quite problematic since there is not a strong theoretical case for supplementary variables affecting the participation in the credit market without having much effect on the amount borrowed 4 .
In our two-step Heckman procedure, we have added regional dummies, race and the interaction of employment with the occupational sector to the participation equation as factors that might influence participation in the unsecured debt market without having much effect on the amount borrowed. However, the marginal effects in the Heckman approach are exactly the same as in the simple OLS cross-section regressions. Given this and the results in previous studies we will focus separately on the participation equation (using a probit model) and on debt equations, using simple OLS crosssection regressions including only debtors. (1993)). Other related works are Hayashi (1985) , Zeldes (1989) , Cox and Jappelli (1993), Crook (1996) , Gross and Souleles (2002) . For the UK, Davies and Weber (1991), using household-level data and identifying unconstrained households as those with savings, found evidence of liquidity constraints but not of loosening credit contraints in the 1980s. Bayoumi (1993) found that softer liquidity constraints due to financial deregulation during the 1980s had a significant effect on U.K. consumption. More recently, Fernández-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2002) estimated an index of non-price credit conditions providing evidence of looser credit restrictions during the 1980s and second half of the 1990s. 3 One possible proxy is given in wave 5 when individuals state whether they think that it was a right time to use credit in the hypothetical case that they wanted to buy something bit. One of the possible answers to this question was 'Can't get credit' that was only selected by 2.4 per cent of 8,774 respondents. 4 Cox and Japelli (1993) used years of education, occupation, area income, employment status, and rural/urban status as supplementary variables for the probability of having positive debt. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) and Crook (1996) assumed the same variables for determining the probability of having debt and the amount borrowing (allowing for different parameters in the participation and debt equations). 5 Results using the Heckman procedure are available upon request.
A cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of unsecured debt

The data
The BHPS 6 is an annual national survey of the economic and demographic characteristics of British individuals and households. The first wave covered a representative sample of the population of Great Britain in 1991. And this sample has remained broadly representative since the same individuals are re-interviewed each year and, if they split-off from original households, all adult members of their new households are also interviewed. In 1991 the survey included around 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals (aged over 16 years old).
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Information on unsecured debt and financial assets is available only in waves 5 and 10 of the BHPS covering 1995 and 2000. Individuals are asked about the overall amount they owe excluding credit card and other bills being paid off in the month of the interview. Respondents could have included borrowing in these additional forms of debt in their answers to the survey in 1995 without being prompted. For example, they could have considered borrowing on overdrafts as a form of personal loan. But the change in question must leave room for doubt that this was the case. As shown in Table B , in terms of quantity rather than value, overdrafts represented nearly 7 per cent of the total number of credit instruments mentioned in 2000. Student loans were a less significant 1 per cent of total debt instruments. If borrowing using these instruments were entirely omitted in 1995, but not 2000, then analysis would overstate the increase in unsecured household debt. There is some evidence against this in that Redwood and Tudela (2003) Table C shows that the proportion of individuals reporting that they had any unsecured debt did not change between 1995 and 2000 with around 39 per cent of individuals who answered this question claiming to have at least one form of unsecured debt in both years. 9 Significantly, among those with some debt the mean amount almost doubled from £1,718 in 1995 to £3,272 in 2000. Indeed, unsecured debt approximately doubled at most points of the distribution with the median rising from £700 per debtor in 1995 to £1,500 in 2000 and the 90 th percentile rising from £4,000 to £8,000.
Preliminary Data Description
Indebtedness, defined as the unsecured debt to income ratio, also rose at most points of the distribution. For individuals with some debt, the median increased from 8 per cent to 12 per cent and the indebtedness of those at the 90 th percentile rose from around 45 per cent in 1995 to nearer 80 per cent in 2000.
As suggested by the life-cycle model, there are clear differences in credit market participation by age. In both 1995 and 2000, nearly 60 per cent of individuals aged 20 to 35 years old had at least one form of unsecured-debt (see upper-left panel in Chart 1). This fraction decreases with age to 10 per cent for individuals older than 60 years old. By contrast, differences across age groups in average levels of debt and debt-income ratios for borrowers are not very large, especially in 1995.
The increasing relationship between credit market participation and income is similar in both 1995 and 2000 (see right panels in Chart 1). 10 The unsecured debt-to-income ratio is fairly constant across all but the lowest income groups who had the highest levels of indebtedness. 11 In 2000, the level of borrowing is similar for those below the median income level. Debt levels and indebtedness are higher for all groups in 2000.
Chart 2 shows the relationship between unsecured debt and various measures of secured debt capacity. There is a clear negative relationship between participation in the unsecured debt market and net housing wealth 12 , but the relationship between the amount borrowed and net housing wealth is less clear. In 1995 indebtedness appears to be independent of net housing wealth. This increased most between 1995 and 200 for those with low housing wealth such that there is a slight decreasing relationship in 2000.
9 About 5% of individuals did not answer this question in both 1995 and 2000. 10 Income groups are deciles of the income distribution of the total sample in 1995. In 2000 decile values are updated with the Retail Price Index. 11 In Cox et al (2002) indebtedness seems to be negatively correlated with age and income. Discrepancies can arise since their study focuses on households, not on individuals, and income variables and groups can differ. In addition our analysis excludes all new samples in BHPS since 1997. 12 Net housing wealth is the value of the residential house net of mortgages. Since these are household variables in BHPS we assign half value of the house and mortgage to the first and second person owning the accommodation.
Looking at housing status, owner-occupiers with a mortgage have a higher propensity to hold unsecured debt than other groups in both 1995 and 2000. They also have higher amount of unsecured debt than other groups, although this increased for all groups between 1995 and 2000. Further, among households with mortgages, there seems to be a positive correlation between the level of unsecured debt and the secured-debt-to-income ratio, especially in 2000. This general relationship is consistent with the theoretical model of Section 2, although it is not clear why those with relatively low secured debt to income ratios have any unsecured debt.
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As regards financial wealth 14 there seems to be a negative relationship between total financial assets and the fraction of debtors (see Chart 3). 15 In 2000, there is a relatively clear decreasing relationship between unsecured debt-to-income ratios and financial wealth. 16 Those with a low level of financial assets are more likely to hold unsecured debt to finance their consumption.
All these figures point to a quite generalised increase in average unsecured-debt of borrowers between 1995 and 2000 while no large changes appear to have been in market participation.
Estimation results
While the preceding section provides a broad overview of unsecured debt and its correlation with the characteristics and circumstances of individual borrowers, a major limitation is the inability to disentangle the independent contributions of individual factors. In this sub-section, we use regression-based analysis to assess statistically the key factors determining participation and the amount borrowed in the unsecured debt market.
The explanatory variables in the debt and participation equations include dummies for age to take into account the life cycle stage of individuals and variables aimed at explaining the effect of current and expected income on consumption and borrowing. These variables are actual income, educational qualifications 17 and whether the individual expects an improvement in his financial situation.
Employment status is included to proxy income uncertainty. Some of the income-related variables could also have an additional effect in the reduced form through their impact in the unsecured-debt premium if they are correlated with the risk of default. We also include dummies to take into account whether individuals have access to the mortgage market and, in the case of mortgagees, distinguish them by the level of mortgage-to-income ratio. Gross financial wealth is included in the form of a dummy variable distinguishing those with no financial wealth and those with financial wealth below and above the median in the sample population respectively. Finally we add other demographic variables such as whether the individual is head of the household, gender, marital status and number of dependent children. Other idiosyncratic differences in household preferences and interest rates will be reflected in the error term because as noted earlier with cross-section data we cannot separate the random and systematic component of the residuals. Since most of the explanatory variables take the form of dummy rather than continuous variables, the estimation is relative to a 'reference group' for whom only the constant term is evaluated. The reference group appears in parenthesis in a separate column. 20 According to the estimated probit model the probability of having unsecured debt for the reference group was 0.53 in 2000 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this probability is unchanged from that in 1995.
The age profile in the participation equation is consistent with the theoretical life-cycle model of consumption in that the probability of having debt decreases with age for all but those aged 16 to 20. Indeed, according to the estimated marginal effects, age is the variable that most strongly affects participation. The results suggest that the probability of participating in the credit market is 25 to 30 percentage points lower for individuals older than 60 years old compared to those aged 20 to 30. Those aged 16 to 20 have a significant lower probability of having debt (around 20 p.p.), perhaps 18 This reduces the sample by 185 observations, of which 147 are individuals reporting all their debt in overdrafts. 19 See Table B to see the distribution of these instruments by age. We also made estimations with interactions with income dummies and results were not altered qualitatively. 20 White males, head of household, living in couple, with no dependent children, living in Inner London, aged 20-30, with a high level of education, employed, whose house is owned outright with a value below the 30 th percentile in the sample population, with income between the 50 th and 70 th percentiles and no financial wealth. The head of the household in the BHPS is the principal owner or renter of the residence, and if more than one potential head it is assigned to the eldest.
reflecting their economic immaturity. The age profile did not change significantly between 1995 and 2000 except for the oldest group whose probability of participation rose by 8 percentage points 21 .
The impact of age on the amount of unsecured debt of those who are borrowers is made unclear by the confusion over whether overdraft and student loan borrowing was included in survey responses in 1995. The basic results for 2000, shown as Model 1, do indicate that the amount borrowed is significantly lower for older age groups, with the absolute value of the negative coefficient increasing with age. This is in contrast to the results for 1995 which show that only those younger than 20 years old have significantly less debt than the reference group, in line with the raw data where the amount of unsecured debt of borrowers does not appear to vary systematically by age. While the change in coefficients between 1995 and 2000 is not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance, it is suggestive of an increase in the relative indebtedness of the 20 to 30 year olds in the reference group. But it is not clear whether this is due to a change in their behaviour or a change in the survey question. Some evidence on this is gained by including dummies for individuals with overdrafts and student loans in 2000. In this case, shown as Model 2, the significance of the negative coefficient for individuals aged 30 to 60 disappears, suggesting that there is no discernible age effect in 2000 for those who do not have student loans or overdrafts. One interpretation of these results is that age effects are more apparent when individuals with student loans and overdrafts are included in the sample since such borrowing is done predominantly by young people, this would be consistent with under-recording of unsecured debt in 1995 by those with overdrafts and student loans. For individuals older than 60 years old the amount of debt is significantly lower than the reference group in year 2000 in both Models 1 and 2 indicating that the increase in average debt between the period 1995 and 2000 has been lower for these individuals than for the reference group.
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Differences in income also introduce significant differences in the probability of participating in the credit market. Individuals with income below the 30 th percentile have a significantly lower probability of having any unsecured debt, with an even lower probability for those below the 10 th percentile. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of each income group are similar in 1995 and 2000 cannot be rejected at 5 per cent of significance. However for low-income individuals this hypothesis is accepted with a low probability.
There is also a strong positive relationship between the amount of unsecured debt and income. 23 The size of coefficients show that income is the main variable explaining differences in unsecured debt.
Comparing the results for 1995 and 2000, there is little change in the estimated coefficient for those in the main body of the income distribution. For the lowest-income group the hypothesis of equal coefficients in 1995 and 2000 is rejected at 10 per cent of significance in Model 1 and suggests more 21 The probability of accepting the null hypothesis that the coefficient for this variable is equal in 1995 and 2000 is 0.1342 (See bottom lines in Table D) . 22 Note that this result is not very robust because the probability of accepting the null hypothesis of equal coefficient in 1995 and 2000 for this age group is still quite high: 0.35. 23 Alternatively, we also included income and the square of income as explanatory variables. Qualitative results were the same.
relative demand for debt among those with low incomes or less discrimination against them with respect the reference group. At the same time, the tendency of high-income groups to have higher unsecured debt levels is accentuated in 2000.
Positive expectations of the individual's future financial position are also associated with a larger probability of participation in the credit market. The marginal effect of this variable is stronger in 2000 than in 1995 suggesting that the confident are more willing or able to borrow in 2000 than 1995 (see p-values at the end of Table D) . Good economic prospects are also important in determining the amount of unsecured debt. Table E shows that the dummy variable for positive expectations about the future financial situation is highly significant and positive in both 1995 and 2000 with similar coefficient.
The lack of educational qualifications is also associated with a lower probability of having unsecured debt. In particular, individuals with no educational qualifications have around 10 percentage points lower probability of having debt than high-educated ones. Qualification dummies also indicate that the higher the educational qualification the higher the debt level. There is no strong evidence of a change in the link between qualifications and indebtedness between 1995 and 2000.
As regards labour status, the retired do have a lower probability of having debt, around 10 percentage points lower than for the employed in 1995. This is in addition to the age effect and suggests that retired people are less likely to have unsecured debt at every age than those in work. They also tend to have less unsecured debt when they borrow, but this appears to be much less important in 2000 than in 1995. The unemployed also have a lower probability of participating than the employed, consistent with the possibility of being credit constrained, as well as with their greater uncertainty of future income. Interestingly, as with the retired, the amount of unsecured borrowing by the unemployed, keeping constant all other characteristics, is lower relative to the reference group in 1995 but not 2000. This is consistent with the more depressed labour market in 1995 when the unemployed would have faced more uncertainty about their prospects, while in 2000 unemployment might have been considered more of a temporary problem. Another possible interpretation would be the presence of looser credit restrictions for unemployed in 2000. It is worth noting, however, that in 1995, individuals unemployed for more than a year had significantly less debt, this was not true for the short-term unemployed who might need time to restructure their debt balances according to their new situation.
The self-employed are less likely to borrow in the unsecured credit market but have more debt when they do. This might be because they have other sources of finance, but greater general demand for finance for business reasons when they participate in the market.
The interpretation of the results for full time students is complicated by the change in the wording of the question in the survey. 24 They appear to have had a lower propensity to participate in the credit market than the employed in 1995, but this may be because they were not asked to include student loans in their answer to the question. When student loans and overdrafts are included in 2000, the estimated marginal effect of being a full time student is positive but insignificant, suggesting that the likelihood of full-time students participating in the unsecured credit market is the same as for other individuals with the same characteristics.
For those who do participate, full-time students had a relatively larger demand for unsecured debt in both 1995 and 2000, with similar marginal effects in the two years. This is likely to be due to their better prospects and access to cheaper credit relative to their peers of similar observable circumstances.
Housing tenure and access to secured debt affect both the probability of having unsecured debt and the amount borrowed. In 1995, those who are not owner occupiers and those with a mortgage had around a 15 percentage points higher probability of having unsecured debt than those living in houses owned outright. Differences in the ratio of mortgage-debt to income produce a slight humpshaped pattern with respect the probability of being in the market with the highest participation of those with mortgage debt to income ratio around the median. In terms of the amount borrowed, only those with secured debt to income above the eightieth percentile of the distribution had significantly more debt in 1995 and 2000, consistent with these individuals having used up cheaper sources of funds.
There are also differences among those without a mortgage but with housing equity. There appears to be some evidence that people would prefer to borrow in the unsecured market than re-enter the mortgage market. In 2000 those who had no mortgage and were in the top percentile in terms of housing equity had more unsecured debt than the reference group. This could reflect the presence of costs when withdrawing equity from the house value and the relatively low interest rate of some forms of unsecured debt.
Financial wealth is also an important determinant. Consistent with Banks et al. (2002) those with no financial wealth (reference group in the regression) are more likely to have unsecured debt than those with the largest financial assets holdings. However, having a moderate amount of financial assets is associated with a larger probability of having some debt, especially in 2000. In terms of the quantity of debt, the empirical results indicate that those with financial assets have lower amounts of unsecured debt. Between 1995 and 2000 there has been an increase in the probability of market participation for those with financial wealth, but the increase in the amount borrowed by those with above median financial wealth has been relatively lower.
Finally, the increase in the constant term in the debt level equation between 1995 and 2000 implies an increase in the expected debt of the reference borrowers. Given the small changes in the coefficients between 1995 and 2000 this increase can be considered as generalised and probably explained by changes in the macroeconomic environment and credit market structure that cannot be modelled appropriately with our data set. On the other hand, the evolution of the explanatory variables is another key aspect to understand the increase on unsecured debt between 1995 and 2000.
With respect credit contract terms it is interesting to stress that both interest rates and the increase in competition in the credit market might have played an important role that, unfortunately, cannot be addressed with the BHPS. Some evidence of a reduction in the unsecured debt spreads and of longer average terms of consumer credit is shown in Chart 4. As can be seen, the spreads differ largely by type of debt instrument and the reduction of spreads during the second half of the 1990s does not affect all instruments equally. While the interest rate spread of personal loans (of more than £10,000) on the retail bank base rate has experienced a significant reduction from around 10 points to 6 points, in the case of overdrafts it has fluctuated between 12 and 10 points. As regards the maturity of unsecured debt, the weight of personal loans with original maturity greater than four years increased from 22 per cent in 1995 to 35 per cent in 2000. However the number of loans with original maturity between one and four years decreased from 64 per cent to around 50 per cent. Whether this is a demand or supply effect is something we do not know but it has allowed individuals to sustain higher levels of debt without increasing regular re-payments of debt.
Regarding the evolution of explanatory variables Chart 5 shows the sample weights of different population groups by some of the key variables determining credit market participation and debt amount. As it can be seen, there are some important shifts in the population characteristics that might have affected the stock of aggregate debt. In particular the shift in the number of individuals towards higher income groups (in real terms) is quite large as well as the increase in the proportion of individuals with high qualifications. These two characteristics are related with both a higher participation and amount of debt and can also contribute to explain the increase in the amount of unsecured debt observed in an aggregate form.
A useful way of summarising the estimation results is to show the fitted value of debt conditional on having debt. Chart 6 shows the predicted age and income profile of unsecured-debt levels for the reference group. In contrast to the simple patterns that might be present in the raw data, the regression approach makes it possible to hold constant all other factors (such as housing tenure, labour market status) that might also vary with income and age. A quite flat hump-shaped profile with respect to age is observed and the increase in the expected debt from 1995 is considerable for all age groups. With respect to income, the expected debt of borrowers increases very rapidly.
Summarising, cross-section differences in the demand for debt by borrowers is highly determined by income and good financial prospects, while the impact of age, employment status and housing tenancy status are either not clearly consistent with the model or are not highly significant. One possible explanation is that results are distorted due to the large variety of debt instruments included as unsecured debt in terms of maturity, interest rates and purposes such as the financing of expensive durable consumption, human capital investment and non-durable consumption. In addition, life cycle patterns might be obscured by the increasing relevance of borrowing against housing wealth to finance non-housing consumption 25 .
When comparing 1995 and 2000 we do not observe substantial changes in the factors affecting credit market participation, with only a relatively larger increase in the probability of having unsecured debt of those aged over 60 years old, self employed, with good financial prospects and positive financial wealth. When comparing expected values of debt between 1995 and 2000 we see that the marginal effects are larger for individuals in the tails of the income distribution in 2000, retired and unemployed. While they are lower for those aged over 60 years old and self-employed. In addition, the increase in debt is a quite generalised phenomenon captured to a large extent by the large increase in the constant in the equation. This suggest that the change in interest rates levied on unsecured debt and the change in other aspects of these contracts, such as the maturity, might be important factors explaining the higher level of debt of debtors in 2000. Equally important, the evolution of explanatory variables suggests that the shift of individuals towards higher income groups and high qualifications, which are positively related with the amount of debt, is also an important factor explaining the increase debt levels in aggregate terms.
Changes in levels of unsecured debt: panel estimation
Previous analysis made no use of the fact that the same individuals are present in both the 1995 and 2000 samples so that their behaviour may be tracked over time. In this section we discuss evidence on changes in the borrowing of the same individuals. Table C shows that despite the apparent stability in credit market participation and general increase in the amount borrowed, there is considerable change in the position of individual borrowers as they move into and out of debt. Among those in the top quartile of debt in 1995, 41 per cent of them were still highly indebted in 2000, but 35 per cent of them had reduced their debt to zero. There appears to be more persistence at low debt levels in that 78 per cent of people with no unsecured debt in 1995 still had no debt in 2000, whereas only 8 per cent of them had moved to the top quartile.
We now use regression analysis to find out whether the changes in debt levels of individuals between 1995 and 2000 are related to changes in the determinants of debt. Differencing (3.3), assuming no change in the coefficients across the two years gives: marginally significant, and this could suggest that the unobservable characteristics that induce people to participate in the unsecured credit market are negatively correlated with the unobservable factors determining how much they borrow having entered the market. This is the opposite of the effect that would be obtained if we think that market participation decisions are affected by the presence of entry costs. Then this term should be positive, as in Crook (2001), to indicate that those being in the sample of borrowers tend to demand larger funds. In our case, the negative term in 2000 means that the unobserved factors in the equation for positive debt are negatively related with the amount of debt. One possible explanation for this effect is that the unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics of those who are the most eligible borrowers from the perspective of lenders also reduce the amount that these individuals wish to borrow. However, it is not clear why this factor should be stronger in 2000 than 1995. An alternative possible interpretation is related to the presence of costs when withdrawing equity from the housing value. These costs may induce individuals with a higher demand for funds to borrow in the secured debt market while only those with a lower demand for funds would borrow in the unsecured-debt market, even though they have to pay a premium. This effect would be stronger in the stronger housing market conditions of 2000.
Thus, in general terms, the change in the unsecured debt of an individual embodies a general age effect as the individual moves further along the life-cycle and responds to changes in economic circumstances (reflected here in the income term), changes in personal characteristics and changes in macroeconomic conditions (reflected here in the change in interest rates).
We estimate this equation using the change in the level of unsecured debt as the dependent variable. Among the dependent variables we include the change in income allowing for a non-linear effect, the change in educational qualifications, 26 in labour status, in financial wealth and in the mortgage stock.
The changes in the labour status are considered with different dummy variables indicating whether the individual found a job, whether he became unemployed, among others combinations of the different labour status considered previously. The changes in the mortgage stock are split up in four categories. We consider separately the change in the mortgage of those increasing the stock of secured debt, the change of those decreasing the mortgage and dummy variables for those who have the same mortgage in 1995 and 2000. We also include age dummies to capture the stage of the life cycle and a dummy variable to consider whether the individual expects an improvement in his financial situation. The constant term picks up the effect of general changes in macroeconomic and credit market conditions relevant to the reference group who consist of individuals between the age of 20 and 30 in 1995 who are employed in both years.
The estimation results are presented in Table F . Two adjustments are included to deal with the change in survey question. In the first case we include a dummy variable for those with overdrafts and student loans in 2000. In the second case we exclude individuals with student loans and overdrafts in 2000.
The results tend to bear out those found in the cross section although the effect of age is much more apparent here once the individual specific fixed effects have been differenced out. 27 Those aged between 45 and 60 reduced their unsecured debt by over £500 more than those between 20 and 30, while those over 60 reduced their debt by over £700 more than their younger counterparts.
The increase in income is statistically significant in explaining the increase in debt. When separating this variable between low and high-income individuals, 28 this effect is larger for those with low incomes in 1995 consistent with a non-linear effect.
As in the cross section results, there is clear evidence of the effect of expectations on unsecured borrowing. Expectations of a better financial situation have a significant positive impact. Similarly an increase in educational qualifications, likely associated with improved economic prospects, raises unsecured borrowing.
Changes in the labour market position of the individual also have an impact on borrowing. The effect of being unemployed in both 1995 and 2000 appears to offset the general upward trend in borrowing, although this effect is not precisely determined statistically. Becoming employed or self-employed (from being without work) has a significant positive effect on the change in debt.
The impact of changes in the secured debt market is again surprising in that there is evidence of increasing unsecured debt among those reducing their mortgage. This bears out some of the cross section evidence that unsecured borrowing is being undertaken by those who have unused secured debt capacity.
As with the cross-section results, there is clear evidence of a general increase in unsecured debt captured in the constant term in the equation, worth £600 per individual. This is close to the median increase of £800 of those with unsecured debt in the whole sample, indicating that this factor is most important in explaining the general increase. This effect is present even when individuals with student loans or overdrafts are excluded from the comparison.
Conclusions
According to the BHPS, the proportion of individuals with unsecured debt did not change between 1995 and 2000 with around 39 per cent of individuals claiming that they had least one form of unsecured debt. However, the average level of unsecured debt held by borrowers more than doubled during this period of five years.
We use waves 5 and 10 of the BHPS to examine the determinants of credit market participation and the amount of unsecured debt in 1995 and 2000 and assess whether these have changed between the two years.
Participation in the unsecured credit market tends to decrease with age and it is significantly lower for the retired and unemployed, those with no qualifications, and income below the median. It also tends to be higher for those with optimistic expectations of their financial position and those without access to the mortgage market.
The main variable explaining cross-section differences in levels of unsecured debt appears to be income, but also good prospects for the financial situation. The effect of age is less clear-cut and appears to be less important than theory would suggest.
There has been little change in the relationship between secured and unsecured borrowing over these two years. Those with a high secured-debt-to-income ratio also tend to have a high demand for unsecured since they might have used up cheaper sources of funds. Contrary to what we expected, non-owners occupiers did not have a higher amount of unsecured debt since they probably are perceived as more risky, having access to unsecured-debt instruments with a higher premium. For given circumstances, the self-employed and full time students had more unsecured debt than other groups, though for students comparisons between 1995 and 2000 are sensitive to the introduction of new listed instruments in the 2000 questionnaire. Finally there appears to have been a general increase in debt that cannot be accounted for by cross-section differences. We show that the course of interest rates could have also contributed to the increase in debt, but a longer longitudinal data would be needed to assess their impact. The simulation model showed that a fall in the relative cost of unsecured borrowing would raise unsecured borrowing among those participating in the market and affecting marginally those who do not participate. This is the pattern we have observed in practice.
On the other hand, the positive relationship between the amount of debt and income and educational qualifications suggests that the increase in income, education qualifications and good prospects on future financial situation contribute significantly to explain the increase in unsecured-debt. This is also confirmed in the panel analysis. Main case: δ = 0.3, α = 0.05, γ =0.25, φ = 0.90.
Unsecured premium = 0.1 Unsecured premium = 0.05 For each variable the first row corresponds to the interaction with year 1995, and the second for 2000. The estimation include 7 region dummies. See also notes in Table D . 
